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Abstract 
In 1999 general assistance recipients in New York City were required to participate in a 
job training and outplacement assistance program. Initially, recipients were enrolled in 
‘waves’ due to capacity constraints. The program’s impact is identified using a quasi-
experiment in which selectees are compared to concomitantly eligible non-selectees. 
Selectees are 15 percentage points more likely to start a job and 10 percentage points 
more likely to exit welfare than are non-selectees. This methodology is important since 
random-assignment experiments can be costly and difficult to implement. Further, 
experiments are not impervious to criticism; this procedure addresses three of five known 
shortcomings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades U.S. welfare programs have been transformed. A 
central objective of the reforms has been to help recipients move from welfare to work. In 
response, a variety of ‘welfare-to-work’ programs have been implemented. They 
typically include one or more of the following components: unpaid work experience, 
classroom instruction, on-the-job training, financial incentives, and job search assistance. 
A substantial literature has developed to identify the resulting changes in welfare 
use, employment, well-being, and family structure [recent reviews include Blank, 2002; 
Grogger and Karoly, 2005; Moffitt, 2003]. The results largely support the following two 
conclusions: First, in the short run, at least, welfare-to-work programs had the intended 
effect, reducing welfare use and increasing employment. Second, the most effective 
welfare-to-work programs are those that include mandatory work requirements with an 
emphasis on job placement [Grogger and Karoly, 2005].  
These findings are largely derived from well-designed random-assignment 
experiments. While such experiments are certainly an excellent method for identifying 
the effect of a welfare-to-work program, they are not impervious to criticism. The 
following five shortcomings have been identified and are summarized in Grogger and 
Karoly [2005]: First, since experimental programs are often implemented by above-
average managers, it is unclear whether successful pilot programs can be expanded 
without losses in effectiveness. Second, experiments miss some general equilibrium 
effects. For example, whereas full-scale implementation of a welfare-to-work program 
might crowd-out other job seekers or even subsequent program participants, a pilot 
program might not. Third, the ‘message’ of the pilot program may cross-over from the 
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program group to the control group. Fourth, experiments that only include current welfare 
recipients do not capture entry effects. That is, a welfare-to-work program may change 
the attractiveness of receiving welfare and therefore not only effect the exit rate, but also 
the entry rate. Finally, random-assignment experiments can be costly and hard to 
implement.  
The first four shortcomings are noteworthy since each could cause experimental 
estimates to be biased. For example, the first presumably introduces a positive bias and 
the third a negative bias. Thus, available estimates, which are largely based on 
experimental evidence, are potentially biased with the direction and magnitude of the 
overall bias unknown. Moreover, no new random-assignment experiments have been 
conducted since the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA).1 
A few non-experimental and quasi-experimental studies have explored the effect 
of welfare-to-work programs. Two of these studies have challenged the claim that the 
most effective welfare-to-work programs are those that emphasize rapid job placement 
[Hotz et al, 2006; Dyke et al, 2006]. These authors find that more intensive training, 
which emphasizes human capital development, generates larger positive effects. These 
effects, however, take longer to emerge than do the effects of programs that emphasize 
job placement.2 
The paucity of non-experimental and quasi-experimental studies is largely due to 
two factors. First, there has been a shortage of clever strategies (in the absence of 
random-assignment) to identify the effects of welfare-to-work programs using 
administrative data. Second, welfare-to-work programs vary along numerous dimensions, 
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making it difficult to parameterize the programs in a manner that is useful for 
identification. Thus, data from nationally representative surveys has not been successfully 
used to estimate the effect of welfare-to-work programs.3 
In this paper, I demonstrate a quasi-experimental identification strategy to 
estimate the effect of a welfare-to-work program. To do so, I take advantage of a quirk in 
the program’s administration. Specifically, when the program was initiated, all eligible 
General Assistance (GA) recipients could not participate concurrently due to capacity 
constraints.4 Rather, GA recipients were selected for the program in ‘waves.’ The wave 
enrollment process creates the opportunity to identify the effect of the program by 
comparing ‘selectees,’ recipients who were selected on a given date to ‘non-selectees,’ 
recipients who were eligible, but not selected, on that date. The results indicate that the 
program increased the likelihood that a recipient started a job by 15 percentage points and 
increased the likelihood that a recipient exited welfare by 10 percentage points. 
This quasi-experiment is similar to a random-assignment experiment in that it 
enables one to estimate the effect of a welfare-to-work program. It also ameliorates three 
of the five previously discussed shortcomings of random-assignment experiments. First, 
the program was not a small-scale, pilot program implemented by above-average 
managers. Rather, it was the principal welfare-to-work program for all welfare recipients 
in New York City (NYC). Second, this analysis should capture general equilibrium 
effects in the labor market given: (1) the size of program, over 10,000 GA recipients were 
enrolled during the program’ first year, and (2) the number of welfare recipients who 
started a job, over 100,000 recipients of Family Assistance (FA) and GA combined 
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reported finding a job during the program’s first two years. Finally, this program was not 
a costly, or difficult to implement, random-assignment experiment. 
The next section of this paper presents an overview of welfare reform in NYC. 
The third section describes the quasi-experimental identification strategy. The fourth 
section discusses the empirical implementation. The fifth section presents the results. The 
sixth section describes a robustness check that was performed. The final section discusses 
the findings and presents a brief fiscal cost benefit analysis. 
WELFARE REFORM IN NYC 
In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani, newly elected mayor of NYC, made reforming the 
City’s welfare programs a priority. At the time, NYC had over one million welfare 
recipients, including almost 300,000 GA recipients. The City was spending 
approximately three billion dollars annually on welfare programs, including one billion 
dollars on GA. 
In 1995, NYC initiated the Work, Accountability, and You (NYCWAY) program. 
A central tenet of NYCWAY was that able-bodied welfare recipients were required to 
work in exchange for their benefits.5 Almost all recipients fulfilled this requirement by 
participating in a Work Experience Program (WEP) assignment 21 hours per week.6 The 
majority of WEP participants worked outdoors removing litter, weeds, and graffiti from 
parks, vacant lots, streets, and highways. Over the next six years, the number of welfare 
recipients in NYC declined by more than 50% and the number of GA recipients declined 
by 70%.  
In 1999, NYC created the Employment Services and Placement Program (ESPP), 
a job training and outplacement assistance program. With the implementation of the 
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ESPP, welfare recipients were required to participate in a WEP assignment three days a 
week and in the ESPP two days a week. This increased, from 21 to 35, the number of 
hours per week that recipients were required to spend in structured activities.  
Eleven private contractors were hired to provide ESPP services. All had a history 
of providing social services in NYC. The contractors were paid on a performance basis. 
They received a substantial payment for each recipient they placed in a job; the average 
payment was approximately $3,000. The contractors focused on developing participants’ 
‘soft skills’ including résumé writing and interview techniques, and helped participants 
arrange job interviews. ESPP contractors were required to attempt to place each 
participant for at least six weeks.  
Prior to implementation, there were over 10,000 GA recipients who were eligible 
for the ESPP. To be eligible, a GA recipient had to be participating in a WEP assignment 
and job-ready.7 Since all eligible GA recipients could not be accommodated 
simultaneously, recipients were enrolled in waves. Selectees were informed by mail of 
their status, instructed to report to the proper location at a prescribed date and time (the 
program start date was typically two weeks after the selection date), and advised that they 
would be sanctioned if they failed to comply with the program’s requirements. New 
waves were formed every two weeks until each eligible GA recipient was selected or had 
become ineligible. 
Recipients were selected for each wave centrally by computer programmers. The 
selection process did not include intake interviews or objective assessments. The 
intention was to generate a random sample of selectees for each wave stratified by 
borough. In the fourth section, I report that the selection process did not approximate a 
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random one and discuss the attendant adjustments that are made to the estimates 
presented in this paper. 
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
Generally, to identify the effect of a program one compares the outcomes of 
treated and untreated individuals. In the case of the ESPP, recipients who remained 
eligible should have ultimately been treated. Thus, recipients who remained untreated 
must have become ineligible prior to being selected for the ESPP and do not make a valid 
comparison group.8 
An Alternative Approach to Identify the Effect of the ESPP 
It is possible, however, to estimate the effect of the ESPP taking advantage of the 
wave enrollment process. To do so, I compare all selectees from a given wave to all ‘non-
selectees,’ recipients who were eligible but not selected, for the same wave. By 
performing this comparison for each of the first 17 waves, and combining all selectees 
into one group, the program group, and all non-selectees into another group, the control 
group (see Figure 1), I can estimate the Program Effect (PE).9 Specifically, the PE is 
defined as, 
)]0([)]1([ =−= iMiiMi PYEPYE  (1) 
where )( i
M
i PY  is an indicator function which equals one if individual i started a job 
within M months of his or her inclusion in the program or control group and zero 
otherwise, and is a function of whether recipient i was a member of the program group, 
Pi=1, or the control group, Pi=0. <<Figure 1 here>> 
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All selectees are placed in the program group, and considered treated, regardless 
of whether or not they participated in the ESPP. This even includes recipients who failed 
to attend the ESPP orientation. Hence the PE is an ‘Intent to Treat’ (IT) effect and should 
not suffer from self-selection bias.10 Members of the program group remain in the 
program group for the remainder of the study; that is, there is no program group attrition. 
Further, this identification strategy does not suffer from control group attrition. 
Each member of the control group remains in the control group for the remainder of the 
study. For example, control group members who subsequently were selected, and or 
exited welfare, remain in the control group.  
On the other hand, the identification strategy does suffer from control group 
contamination. Over 70% of control group members were selected for the ESPP 
subsequent to their inclusion therein. Consequently, the PE is negatively biased and a 
conservative estimate of the program’s true effect.  
Adjusting for Control Group Contamination 
To adjust for control group contamination, a set of additional, restricted control 
groups is created in which recipients are removed from the control group if they were 
selected within a given number of waves of their inclusion in the control group. For 
example, a control group with a one-wave restriction on being selected is created by 
removing members of the original control group if they were selected in the subsequent 
wave. So, a non-selectee from the first wave, who was a selectee for the second wave, 
would be excluded from this restricted control group.  
It is important to note that the original control group includes two distinct cohorts: 
(1) non-selectees who remained eligible and were ultimately selected, and (2) non-
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selectees who became ineligible prior to being selected. This distinction is important 
because all members of the original control group who are removed to form the restricted 
control groups must have remained eligible (since they were selected). That is, they must 
have been in the first cohort. For the restricted control group to be a valid comparison 
group for the program group, the ratio of members of cohort one to members of cohort 
two must be the same in the restricted control group as in the original control group. 
Accordingly, the weight placed on members of the first cohort in the restricted control 
group is increased. Specifically, the weight is the reciprocal of the probability that 
members of cohort one were not selected for the subsequent wave (see Figure 2). 
<<Figure 2 here>> 
I utilize the above procedure recursively to create control groups with up to a 
thirty-wave restriction on being selected. Imposing longer restrictions produces very 
large weights that could cause unstable estimates. For example, the maximum weight is 
286 when a thirty-two-wave restriction on being selected is imposed. In this paper, I use 
the initial, unrestricted control group, denoted control group: no restriction, and control 
groups that restrict being selected for an even number of waves. Thus, the restricted 
control groups have a one-month, two-month, three-month, …, or fifteen-month 
restriction on being selected (assuming that each month contains two-waves, or twenty-
eight days). They are denoted control group: 1M restriction, control group: 2M 
restriction, control group: 3M restriction, …., and control group: 15M restriction, 
respectively. 
EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
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With NYC’s permission, the data for this study were extracted from an 
administrative database. The case history and available demographic characteristics were 
compiled for each eligible GA recipient. It should be noted that NYC only collected basic 
demographic information, such as race, gender, and date of birth, for each welfare 
recipient. No additional information is available.  
The program and control groups were formed as described in the prior section. Of 
all selectees and non-selectees (n = 64,800), just over half are men and about 90 percent 
are nonwhite. Their average age is 47 and they are likely to live in the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
or Manhattan (see Table 1). Comparing members of the program group (n = 6,782) and 
control group (n = 58,018), one observes that the average age, years on welfare, and 
gender and racial distributions appear similar. A difference of means test, however, 
reveals that only the gender distribution is not significantly different. The distribution of 
borough of residence is disparate as well. This is presumably the result of stratifying the 
selection by borough. <<Table 1 here>> 
Selection Process Was Not Random 
Given the results of the difference of means tests discussed above, it is unlikely 
that the selection process approximated a random one. To confirm this impression, I test 
whether recipients’ demographic characteristics significantly impact the probability of 
being selected. Specifically, the following probit equation is estimated, 
)(]1[
1
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i
C
c
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wb
c
wbwb
i xFPP ελα ++== ∑
=
 (2)  
where wbiP  is a program group dummy that equals one if individual i was a selectee and 
zero if individual i was a non-selectee in wave w and borough b; and wbicx  is a series of C 
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demographic characteristics for individual i in wave w and borough b. To decrease the 
chance of generating spurious results, equation (2) is only estimated for the three largest 
waves in each of the four largest boroughs; the number of selectees per borough varied 
widely across waves.  
The coefficients on age, and years continuously on welfare, provide strong 
evidence that the selection process was not random. Six of twelve coefficients on age, 
and seven of twelve coefficients on years continuously on welfare, are positive and 
significantly different than zero (see Table 2). Thus, the probability of being selected 
increased with age and welfare tenure.11 For the other demographic characteristics there 
was no discernable selection pattern. <<Table 2 here>> 
One thing is certain though; eligible recipients were selected solely using 
information that was stored in the administrative database. The selection process was 
centralized and conducted by computer programmers. Individual caseworkers were not 
involved in any manner. No intake interviews or objective assessments were conducted 
prior to selection. In other words, the selection process was conducted without human 
discretion. Such a selection process, even if it did not approximate a random one, should 
not disturb the necessary assumption that there was no systematic selection on 
unobserved characteristics. Consequently, by including covariates in the analysis, one 
should be able to adjust for the observed differences. 
Adjusting for observed characteristics 
Since recipients who were older, and who had longer welfare spells, should have 
been less likely to start a job and or exit welfare, the PE as defined in equation (1) is 
potentially negatively biased. To adjust for the observed differences, a program dummy 
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and a series of observed characteristics are regressed on an outcome dummy. 
Specifically, the following equation is estimated,  
M
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)*(  (3) 
where Miy  is an outcome dummy that equals one if individual i started a job within M 
months of being a selectee or non-selectee, and zero otherwise; iP  is a program group 
dummy that equals one if individual i was in the program group and zero if individual i 
was in the control group; icx  is a series of C demographic characteristics for individual i 
at the time that he or she became a selectee or non-selectee; ijB is a borough dummy that 
equals one if individual i resides in borough j and zero otherwise; and ikW  is a wave 
dummy that equals one if individual i was a selectee or non-selectee in wave k and zero 
otherwise. Equation (3) is estimated using OLS for values of M between 0.5 and 26.12 
RESULTS 
Estimating equation (3), one finds that the PE first increases in M, and then after 
peaking, decreases in M, as control group contamination increases (see Figure 3). The 
peak PE is positive and significantly different than zero using each control group. The 
magnitude of the peak PE increases – as well as the number of months required to reach 
it – as the length of the restriction on being selected increases. For example, the peak PE 
is 0.075 (t = 19.8, p = 0) when M = 4, 0.131 (t = 16.2, p = 0) when M = 8, and 0.152 (t = 
12.7, p = 0) when M = 11.5 using control groups: no restriction, 6M, and 12M 
restriction, respectively. <<Figure 3 here>> 
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Further, the PEs using control group: 1M restriction are everywhere below the 
PEs using control group: 2M restriction when M > 2. The former do not diverge from the 
latter until the former’s one-month restriction on being selected expires. This pattern is 
easy to observe in Figure 4a, which presents the PEs using the first four restricted control 
groups only. Figure 4a also reveals that the pattern recurs when one compares the PEs 
using control groups: 2M and 3M restriction, and control groups: 3M and 4M restriction. 
In fact, this pattern is present using each control group between control groups: 1M and 
12M restriction. After that, it stops. The peak PEs, and the PEs in the vicinity of the peak, 
are quite similar using control groups: 12M, 13M, 14M, and 15M restriction (see Figure 
4b). That is, further correction for control group contamination (beyond a twelve-month 
restriction on being selected) does not significantly increase the peak PE. Moreover, the 
peak PE using control group: 14M restriction is slightly larger than is the peak PE using 
control group: 15M restriction (0.158 versus 0.155). Thus, the ESPP appears to increase 
the likelihood of starting a job by approximately 15 percentage points. <<Figure 4 here>> 
This employment effect appears to persist. Comparing the post-peak PEs using 
control groups: 12M, 13M, 14M, and 15M restriction, one observes that the longer the 
restriction, the more months it takes for a consistent post-peak decline to begin. For each 
of these control groups, a consistent post-peak decline begins only after the restriction on 
being selected has ended. For example, the PEs using control group: 12M restriction 
begin to consistently decrease in M when M > 12. This pattern is easy to observe in 
Figure 4b, which presents the PEs using the four most restricted control groups only. 
Thus, the PEs using control group: 15M restriction provides a good estimate of the 
impact of the ESPP for at least fifteen months post selection. 
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The employment effect is presumably not the result of the underlying economic 
conditions, since including borough and wave dummies as well as the interaction term 
should control for any macroeconomic shocks that may have occurred during the study 
period. Further, prematurely terminating the study period on September 11th, 2001 does 
not materially affect the findings; after September 11th, the unemployment rate increased 
by over two percentage points in NYC. 
Estimating equation (3) without covariates, one finds that the PEs decline. For 
example, the PEs decrease by an average of 0.003 and 0.008 using control groups: 6M 
and 12M restriction, respectively (see Figure 5). These declines are not statistically 
significant. Further, they were expected. Recall that the probability of being selected for 
the ESPP was greater for recipients who were older and had longer welfare spells. Such 
recipients were assumed to be less likely to have started a job. Additional support for this 
assumption can be found in the coefficients on age, which are negative and significantly 
different than zero for all values of M (see Table 3). <<Figure 5 here>> <<Table 3 
here>> 
Starting a job is not the sole outcome by which the ESPP should be evaluated. For 
the ESPP to be considered a true success, it should have also increased the probability 
that recipients exited welfare after starting a job.13 Specifically, equation (3) is estimated 
with Miy  redefined as an outcome dummy that equals one if individual i started a job and 
exited welfare for a six-month period within M months of becoming a selectee or non-
selectee, and zero otherwise.14  
The resulting PEs are similar in many respects to the previously estimated PEs. 
Again,  
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• the PE first increases in M, and then peaks (after peaking, however, it does not 
substantially decrease in M);  
• the peak PE is positive and significantly different than zero using each control 
group;  
• the magnitude of the peak PE increases as the length of the restriction increases; 
and  
• the PEs estimated using less restricted control groups are everywhere below the 
PEs estimated using more restricted control groups after the formers’ restriction 
on being selected expires.  
The peak PE is 0.052 (t = 10.4, p = 0) when M = 18.5, 0.091 (t = 9.9, p = 0) when M = 
17, and 0.111 (t = 9.6, p = 0) when M = 17 using control groups: no restriction, 6M, and 
12M, respectively (see Figure 6). Thus, it appears that the ESPP increases the likelihood 
that recipients start a job and exit welfare by approximately 11 percentage points. 
<<Figure 6 here>> 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
One might be concerned that ‘starting a job’ is better observed for members of the 
program group than for members of the control group.15 This is not likely since NYC set 
the ambitious goal of moving 100,000 recipients from welfare to work in 2000. Thus, the 
City had a strong incentive to accurately record each job that was found by a recipient. 
Nevertheless, to rule out this possibility, I estimate the effect of the ESPP on recipients’ 
welfare use. The ESPP should have increased welfare exits, if it increased employment. 
Specifically, equation (3) is estimated with Miy  redefined as an outcome dummy that 
equals one if individual i has exited welfare for a six-month period within M months of 
becoming a selectee or non-selectee and zero otherwise.16 
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The resulting PEs are again similar in many respects to the PEs estimated using 
the initial dependent variable (see Figure 7). Again,  
• the PE first increases in M, and then after peaking, decreases in M, as control 
group contamination increases;  
• the peak PE is positive and significantly different than zero using each control 
group; 
• the magnitude of the peak PE increases as the length of the restriction on being 
selected increases; and  
• the PEs estimated using less restricted control groups are everywhere below the 
PEs estimated using more restricted control groups after the formers’ restriction 
on being selected expires.  
The peak PE is 0.040 (t = 7.2, p = 0) when M = 8, 0.076 (t = 6.4, p = 0) when M = 13, 
0.094 (t = 5.4, p = 0) when M = 13.5, and 0.103 (t = 4.8, p = 0) when M = 13.5 using 
control groups: no restriction, 6M, 12M, and 15M, respectively. Thus, it appears that the 
ESPP increases the likelihood that recipients exit welfare by approximately 10 percentage 
points. <<Figure 7 here>> 
DISCUSSION 
The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a new quasi-
experimental approach to identify the effect of a welfare-to-work program. This is 
important for the following four reasons. First, random-assignment experiments are often 
costly and difficult to implement. Second, random-assignment experiments are not 
impervious to criticism. This quasi-experiment addresses three of five known 
shortcomings. Third, this identification strategy can be used to estimate the effect of other 
government programs that face capacity constraints. For example, the Section 8 program 
is perpetually oversubscribed as are many high performing public schools (in districts 
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with school choice).17 Fourth, this identification strategy can be utilized ex post. In 
contrast, random-assignment experiments need to be designed ex ante.  
The quasi-experiment developed in this paper is not without its own 
shortcomings. Most notably, control group contamination is an inescapable side effect of 
the identification strategy. Even after adjusting for control group contamination to the 
extent possible, one is only able to estimate short-term effects. In the long-run, the PE’s 
negative bias returns after the restriction on being selected expires. This limitation, only 
being able to estimate short-term effects, is not unique to this study. Most research 
regarding welfare reform only makes uses a few years of follow-up data [Friedlander et 
al, 1997].  
Another unique aspect of this study is that it estimates the impact of a welfare-to-
work program on GA recipients; GA is virtually unstudied to date. Yet, GA programs 
serve a large population of economically vulnerable individuals who should be of interest 
to researchers. The ESPP appears to have had a persistent positive impact on GA 
recipients in NYC. It increased the probability that they exited welfare and started a job 
by 10 and 15 percentage points, respectively.18   
Previous studies that estimated the effect of similar welfare-to-work programs – 
those with mandatory work requirements and an emphasis on job placement – on FA 
recipients found that welfare exits and employment increased by an average of 6 and 9 
percentage points, respectively [Grogger and Karoly, 2005]. The ESPP’s effect on GA 
recipients is somewhat larger than the above reported averages. Whether this difference is 
due to the distinct population (GA versus FA recipients), the unique identification 
strategy, or another factor is unclear.  
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This research also contributes to the literature by studying the effect of a welfare-
to-work program in NYC. Neither random-assignment experiments nor non-experimental 
studies have focused on a welfare-to-work program there. Yet, 23 percent of all GA 
recipients, and 7 percent of all FA recipients, lived in NYC in 1996. The only study that 
focuses on the impact of welfare reform in NYC is Chernick and Reimers [2004]. This 
study found that welfare use declined and earnings increased for ‘at risk’ individuals after 
PWRORA.19 The authors acknowledged, however, that the observed changes could have 
been caused by welfare reform, the robust economy, or another factor. 
Finally, one should consider whether the benefits of the ESPP outweighed the 
costs. Preferably, one would conduct a comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) as 
was done in Orr et al [1996]. Unfortunately, such a CBA is not possible due to missing 
data. Specifically, recipients’ earnings are not available. Increased earnings are the 
primary benefit of a training program for an enrollee. 
It is possible, however, to conduct a rough fiscal CBA. The primary cost for the 
government were the fees paid to the ESPP contractors. The average fee was $3,000 per 
placement. Some placed selectees, however, would have found a job without the help of 
an ESPP contractor. Thus, we need to determine the cost of a ‘new’ placement, one that 
would not have occurred without the ESPP. To do so, consider that approximately 35 
percent of selectees started a job during the study period and that the ESPP’s employment 
effect was approximately 15 percentage points, thus NYC had to pay for 35 placements 
to generate 15 new placements. Consequently, the cost of a new placement was 
approximately $7,000 (= $3,000 × (35 ÷ 15)). 
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The primary benefit for the government was a reduction in GA benefits. In early 
2000, a typical GA recipient received $350 per month, or $4,200 annually. Thus, the 
average selectee had to remain off welfare for 1.66 years (= $7,000 ÷ 4,200) for the 
primary fiscal benefit to outweigh the primary fiscal cost. There is not enough post 
selection data, unfortunately, to determine whether this is the case.20 However, at the end 
of the study period, over two-thirds of the selectees who started a job were still off 
welfare. These recipients had already been off welfare for a year, on average. Projecting 
into the future, if one assumes that one-third of the selectees who started a job, and who 
were still off welfare at the end of the study, returned to welfare in each of the three 
subsequent years, then the primary fiscal benefits would surpass the primary fiscal costs. 
Further, there are numerous additional fiscal benefits, for example, decreased 
expenditures on Food Stamps or Medicaid, and few additional fiscal costs; data regarding 
these additional fiscal benefits are not available. Thus, it appears likely that the ESPP 
would pass a fiscal CBA. 
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1 Prior to passage of the PRWORA in 1996, states could receive a ‘waiver,’ permission 
from the federal government, to implement pilot welfare-to-work programs for a portion 
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of their Aid to Families with Dependent Children caseload. As a condition of receiving 
the waiver, the state had to evaluate the pilot program using a random-assignment 
experiment. 
 2 Also using a quasi-experimental approach, Autor and Houseman [2005] have 
demonstrated that, unlike direct-hire jobs, temporary help jobs do not change the 
likelihood that the recipients are employed one to two years post placement.  
3 This is generally true for other components of welfare reform as well. One exception is 
time limits. Using a non-experimental identification strategy, Grogger [2003] 
demonstrates that time limits decrease welfare use. 
 4 GA is cash assistance for financially needy individuals who are not covered by 
federally funded income maintenance programs.  
 5 Other components of NYCWAY included enhanced detection of welfare fraud, 
increased substance abuse treatment, and diversion to federally funded disability 
insurance where appropriate. 
 6 Participants received no compensation other than their welfare benefits and a nominal 
stipend for carfare and lunch. 
 7 GA recipients were deemed job-ready if they did not have physical or emotional 
barriers to employment.  Private contractors were hired to evaluation recipients’ job-
readiness. Over 90 percent of GA recipients who were already participating in a WEP 
assignment were found to be job-ready. 
 8 Becoming ineligible was not exogenous. Recipients could become ineligible by exiting 
welfare or failing to comply with various program requirements. 
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 9 After 17 waves, 6,782 recipients had been selected, 953 remained eligible, and 3,791 
had become ineligible. 
10 In contrast, one could estimate the effect of participating in the ESPP, a ‘Treatment on 
the Treated’ (TT) effect. To do so, one could multiply the IT effect by the inverse of the 
fraction of selectees who received treatment – that is, participated in the ESPP [Orr, 
1996, p. 107-108]. For the TT estimate to be unbiased the following assumption needs to 
hold: The ‘threat’ of treatment cannot have an effect that is similar to the effect of the 
treatment itself; otherwise, the TT estimate will be positively biased. This assumption is 
unlikely to hold since the treatment is mandatory and costly for participants [Black et al, 
2003]. IT and TT effects are further discussed in Katz, Kling, and Liebman [2001]. 
 11 The computer programmers who conducted the selection process mistakenly believed 
that sorting the list of eligible recipients by borough would cause each resulting borough 
list to be randomly ordered. Thus they simply selected recipients from the top of these 
lists. 
 12 This approach enables one to estimate a very general, non-parametric hazard rate. 
Corrected standard errors are calculated by clustering the observations by individual. This 
is necessary since some individuals appear in the dataset repeatedly. M = 26 is the 
maximum number of months for which there is post selection data for each recipient. 
Again, each month is assumed to have 28 days. So there are 26 M’s in two years. 
 13 It would have been interesting to study whether recipients remained employed. 
However, NYC did not collect job retention data, and New York State was unwilling to 
provide the unemployment insurance wage records for study participants. Thus, this 
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measure is used. It provides some information regarding whether recipients remained 
employed, since recipients who lose their job presumably would return to welfare. 
14 This analysis is limited to M ≤ 18, since there are only two years of follow-up data and 
six months of follow-up data are needed to determine whether a recipient exited welfare. 
 15 This concern arises since ESPP contractors were paid for each job placement. Thus the 
contractors had a strong incentive to make sure that each placement was recorded. 
16 Again, this analysis is limited to M ≤ 18, since there are only two years of follow-up 
data and six months of follow-up data are needed to determine whether a recipient exited 
welfare. 
 17 In a future study, this identification strategy will be used to estimate the ESPP’s effect 
on GA recipients’ homeless shelter use. 
 18 It is also likely that the ESPP increased earnings, since most selectees were placed in 
direct hire jobs and such jobs have been shown to increase earnings and quarters of 
employment [Autor and Houseman, 2005]. 
 19 At risk households were defined as those headed by a mother with a minor child as 
well as those headed by an uneducated, non-elderly, childless adult.  
 20 Previous studies have suffered from the same limitation and have projected the 
benefits of short-term training programs into the future as well [Friedlander, 1997]. 
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Members of the Program and Control Group  
Demographic 
characteristic
Observations
Male 0.541 (0.002) 0.539 (0.006) 0.541 (0.002)
Age 47.324 (0.034) 48.199 (0.101) 47.221 (0.036)
Years continuously 3.379 (0.012) 3.716 (0.037) 3.340 (0.013)
   on welfare
Race
   Asian 0.012 (0.000) 0.009 (0.001) 0.012 (0.000)
   Black 0.492 (0.002) 0.478 (0.006) 0.493 (0.002)
   Hispanic 0.352 (0.002) 0.371 (0.006) 0.349 (0.002)
   White 0.095 (0.001) 0.086 (0.003) 0.096 (0.001)
   Not reported 0.042 (0.001) 0.050 (0.003) 0.042 (0.001)
Borough of residence
   Bronx 0.389 (0.002) 0.308 (0.006) 0.399 (0.002)
   Brooklyn 0.309 (0.002) 0.265 (0.005) 0.314 (0.002)
   Manhattan 0.180 (0.002) 0.289 (0.006) 0.168 (0.002)
   Queens 0.111 (0.001) 0.124 (0.004) 0.110 (0.001)
   Staten Island 0.007 (0.000) 0.014 (0.001) 0.006 (0.000)
Standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Bold means are significantly different for the program and control group.
All recipients      
(1)
Control group     
(3)
64,800 58,018
Program group    
(2)
6,782
Table 2 
Coefficients from Estimating Equation (2) for Select Borough-Wave Pairs 
 
  
 
Demographic 
characteristic
Bronx     
3rd wave
Bronx      
4th wave
Bronx      
12th wave
Brooklyn   
3rd wave
Brooklyn   
11th wave
Brooklyn   
16th wave
Manhattan 
1st wave
Manhattan 
2nd wave
Manhattan 
3rd wave
Queens     
4th wave
Queens     
5th wave
Queens     
6th wave
Male -0.0434 0.0592 0.0086 0.1885 -0.1316 0.3983 0.1398 -0.0197 0.0175 0.1497 -0.1053 -0.0159
(0.0632) (0.0675) (0.0732) (0.0755) (0.0904) (0.1151) (0.0700) (0.0716) (0.1047) (0.1195) (0.1216) (0.1348)
Age 0.0077 0.0016 0.0177 0.0119 0.0031 0.0083 0.0070 0.0089 0.0109 0.0070 0.0206 0.0182
(0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0080)
Years continuously 0.0800 0.0674 -0.0199 0.0438 -0.0573 0.0447 0.1091 0.0789 -0.0099 0.0935 0.0123 -0.0418
   on welfare (0.0095) (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0214) (0.0265)
Race
   Asian -0.0227 - - - -0.1606 -1.5415 -0.5790 -0.6611 0.5272 0.1396 -0.3055 0.2656
(0.4157) (0.5724) (0.5917) (0.4508) (0.4702) (0.5006) (0.4093) (0.4715) (0.4792)
   Black -0.0717 -0.0478 0.1155 -0.0862 0.2813 -0.4173 -0.2989 -0.0398 -0.2199 -0.0563 0.0506 0.2926
(0.1324) (0.1456) (0.1931) (0.1551) (0.2430) (0.2618) (0.1325) (0.1728) (0.2677) (0.2828) (0.3126) (0.3627)
   Hispanic 0.0867 -0.0490 0.2344 -0.0503 0.3712 -0.3528 -0.2489 -0.0200 0.1130 0.0994 0.1166 0.5131
(0.1271) (0.1420) (0.1906) (0.1634) (0.2516) (0.2753) (0.1326) (0.1734) (0.2674) (0.2976) (0.3280) (0.3796)
   White 0.2063 -0.1216 -0.0126 -0.3179 0.1867 -0.6867 -0.1420 -0.2260 -0.4293 -0.1750 -0.0310 0.0423
(0.1827) (0.2156) (0.2555) (0.1894) (0.2652) (0.2920) (0.1824) (0.2211) (0.3510) (0.3029) (0.3296) (0.3826)
Standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Bold coefficients are significantly different than zero at p < 0.01
Bold Italicized coefficients are significantly different than zero at p < 0.05
Table 3 
Coefficients from Estimating Equation (3) using Control Group: 6M restriction 
 
  
 PE 0.1310 (0.0078) 0.1348 (0.0077) 0.1309 (0.0081) 0.075 (0.01) 0.0823 (0.0125) 0.0823 (0.0129)
Male -0.0092 (0.0110) -0.0066 (0.0112) -0.0182 (0.0208) -0.0147 (0.0208)
Age -0.0016 (0.0006) -0.0017 (0.0006) -0.0042 (0.0011) -0.0044 (0.0011)
Years continuously -0.0020 (0.0016) -0.0024 (0.0017) 0.0015 (0.0034) -0.0002 (0.0034)
   on welfare
Race
   Asian 0.0835 (0.0673) 0.0690 (0.0661) 0.0566 (0.1083) 0.0393 (0.1057)
   Black 0.0096 (0.0220) 0.0007 (0.0218) 0.0199 (0.0460) 0.0116 (0.0467)
   Hispanic -0.0051 (0.0222) -0.0042 (0.0220) -0.0516 (0.0460) -0.0431 (0.0471)
   White 0.0055 (0.0263) -0.0165 (0.0266) -0.0199 (0.0540) -0.0514 (0.0547)
Borough of residence
   Bronx -0.0538 (0.1184) -0.0764 (0.1650)
   Brooklyn 0.0159 (0.1190) 0.0417 (0.1651)
   Manhattan -0.0090 (0.1220) 0.0238 (0.1692)
   Queens 0.0456 (0.1320) 0.0233 (0.1807)
Wave dummy
Interaction term
Standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Bold coefficients are significantly different than zero at p < 0.01
Eight months (sixteen waves) post selection (M  = 8)Demographic 
characteristic
Two years post selection (M  = 26)
(4) (5) (6)(1) (2) (3)
Yes
No Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Figure 1 
The Formation of the Program and Control Groups 
The program group: 
All selectees from the first 17 waves.  Specifically it is the union of T1, T2, T3, ….., T17. 
 
The control group: 
All non-selectees from the first 17 waves.  Specifically it is the union of C1, C2, C3, ….., C171.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Repeat the process through the 17th wave (on 6/15/2000) 
                                                 
1 Note that many recipients were non-selectees in multiple waves.  Consequently, many recipients are 
members of the control group multiple times. 
6,250 recipients were  
eligible on 11/17/99 
6,790 recipients were  
eligible on 11/3/99 
652 eligible recipients  
selected on 11/3/99 
6,138 eligible recipients  
not selected on 11/3/99 
619 eligible recipients  
selected on 11/17/99 
5,631 eligible recipients  
not selected on 11/17/99 
5,910 recipients were 
 eligible on 12/2/99 
905 eligible recipients  
selected on 12/2/99 
5,005 eligible recipients  
not selected on 12/2/99 
T1 
C1 
T2 
T3 
C3 
C2 
1st wave 
2nd wave 
3rd wave 
Figure 2 
The Formation of the Program Group and the Control Group with a One-Wave Restriction on Being Selected 
The treatment group: 
All selectees from the first 17 waves.  Specifically it is the union of T1, T2, T3, ….., T17. 
 
The control Group with a one-wave restriction on being selected 
All recipients who were: 
 
1. non-selectees during any of the first 17 waves and 
2. not selected in the wave subsequent to the one in which they were a non-selectee. 
 
Specifically it is a weighted union of C1a, C1b, C2a, C2b, C3a, C3b, ….., C17a, C17b.  The weight placed on each member of each a-series cohort is equal to 
one.  The weight placed on each member of each b-series cohort is equal to the reciprocal of the probability of not being selected in the subsequent wave, 
conditional on being eligible to be selected in that wave, for example, for members of C1b the weight is the reciprocal of (5,248/5,860), or (1/0.896 ) = 1.116. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Repeat the process through the 17th wave (on 6/15/2000) 
5,860 eligible recipients 
 on 11/17/99 
6,790 recipients were 
 eligible on 11/3/99 
652 eligible recipients 
 selected on 11/3/99 
6,138 eligible recipients  
 not selected on 11/3/99 
C1b 
278 ineligible recipients 
 on 11/17/99 
612 eligible recipients 
selected on 11/17/99
C1a 1st wave T1 
5,248 eligible recipients 
not selected on 11/17/99
5,354 eligible recipients 
 on 12/2/99 
6,250 recipients were 
 eligible on 11/17/99 
619 eligible recipients 
 selected on 11/17/99 
5,631 eligible recipients  
 not selected on 11/17/99 
C2b 
277 ineligible recipients 
 on 12/2/99 
899 eligible recipients 
selected on 12/2/99
C2a 2nd wave T2 
4,455 eligible recipients 
not selected on 12/2/99
Figure 3 
Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job using all control groups 
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Figure 4 
a) Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job using four least restricted control groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job using four most restricted control groups 
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Figure 5 
Estimated effect of ESPP with various covariates included using control groups: 6M and 12M restriction 
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Figure 6 
Estimated effect of ESPP on starting a job and exiting welfare using all control groups  
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Estimated effect of ESPP on exiting welfare using all control groups  
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